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Abstract—McEliece cryptosystem represents a smart open key
system based on the hardness of the decoding of an arbitrary
linear code, which is believed to be able to resist the advent
of quantum computers. But the original McEliece cryptosystem,
based on Goppa codes, has just very limited interest in practice,
partly because it requires a very large public key. In this paper
we propose a new general way to reduce the public key size.
Unlike most papers on reducing key length of the cryptosystem,
where original Goppa codes are substituted by some other codes,
we suggest a new method of key size reduction which is code-
independent.
Index Terms—Code-based cryptosystem, informational set de-
coding, key size reduction.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976 W. Diffie and M. Hellman proposed the public-
key cryptography concept [1]. To construct the public-key
cryptosystem one need to construct the one-way trap-door
function. To achieve this, the hard computational problem
should be selected, which nevertheless has simple solutions
in some special cases. It is supposed that attacker (intruder)
who desires to ”break” the system should solve the hard
problem (i.e. compute the correspondent plaintext from given
ciphertext), while legitimate user, using his private key, obtains
the simple special case of the hard problem and solves it for
decryption.
However, to break the system one may not search for
solution of the hard problem being used, but look for another
function instead, providing decryption without knowledge of
the private key. If such function would be computationally
efficient, this leads to breaking the system without solution
of initial hard problem. Excellent example of such attack on
Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem [2] was given by A. Shamir [3].
An attempt of similar attack on code-based cryptosystems was
made in [4].
Code-based McEliece cryptosystem was proposed in 1978
[5]. Task which is a basis of McEliece cryptosystem is a
decoding of linear codes. It is well-known that the decoding
of an arbitrary linear code is computationally difficult task but
there are some classes of codes, say RS, BCH, LDPC codes
that have polynomial-time decoding algorithms. The main idea
underlying McEliece cryptosystem is to hide structured code
with simple decoding algorithm (secret key) presenting it as
a random code (open key) for which a simple decoder is
unknown.
Original McEliece cryptosystem gain no wide practical
usage, and the most common-used public-key cryptosystem for
today is RSA [6]. However, RSA is based on intractability of
integer factorization, for which the polynomial-time quantum
algorithm was proposed by Shor [7]. At the same time no
effective quantum algorithm is known to break McEliece
cryptosystem.
The main drawback of McEliece cryptosystem is a very long
public key. For example, in the original paper by McEliece
open key has size 262000 bits.
There are a number of attempts to overcome this main
disadvantage of code-based cryptosystem. The main of them
have the same idea of substituting the original Goppa code
that is used in McEliece cryptosystem to some other one
with a specific structure that allows to reduce open key size.
For instance in paper [9] Goppa codes are substituted by
subfield subcodes of quasi-cyclic generalized Reed-Solomon
codes. It allows to obtain cryptosystem with key size from
6000 to 11000 bits with security ranging from 280 to 2107. In
paper [10] quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check codes
(QC-MDPC) were suggested to implement in McElece cryp-
tosystem. It results in significant key size reduction up to
0.6 KBytes that makes code-based cryptosystem practically
feasible. Very similar instance of the cryptosistem is based on
QC-LDPC codes and was proposed in [11]. In paper [12] was
shown how to adapt QC-MDPC based cryptosystem for such
low-power devices as RFID.
The main drawback of substituting Goppa codes by either
QC-LDPC or QC-MDPC codes is as follows: it is well-known
that practical hard-decoding algorithms of QC-LDPC and QC-
MDPC codes does not take into account the minimal distance
of these codes. Thus for a given error vector e with fixed
weight 𝑡 we can not guarantee that it will be decoded with zero
probability of error. Moverover, practically used QC-LDPC or
QC-MDPC codes usually have rather small minimal distance
(of the order of tens for codes of rate 𝑅 = 12 and a length of
several thousand).
In this paper we suggest another approach of key length
reduction. It is a universal and can be applied for any (𝑛, 𝑘)
code. The proposed cryptosystem is based on the approach that
was suggested in [13], but has some significant improvements:
it is stable for both syndrome-based and rank attacks and also
can be constructed for any linear block code even for the
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cases when this code does not have simple polynomial-time
decoding algorithm.
II. MCELIECE ORIGINAL CRYPTOSYSTEM
Let us describe a concept of McEliece open key cryptosys-
tem.
Let us assume that plaintext is represented as a 𝑞-ary vector
u of length 𝑘. Let us assume that we have some (𝑛, 𝑘) 𝑡-error
correcting code 𝐶, represented by it’s generator matrix G and
there is a polynomial time decoder 𝜉 of 𝐶. If we denote by
𝜑 and 𝜑−1 encryption and decryption procedures respectively,
then code-based cryptosystem can be described as follows:
1) Encryption: calculate 𝜑(u) = c = uG′+e = uSGP+
e, where S some non-singular 𝑘×𝑘 random matrix over
F𝑞 , P is 𝑛 × 𝑛 permutation matrix and e is a 𝑞-ary
random vector: 𝑤(e) ≤ 𝑡, i. e. weight of e is not greater
then code 𝐶 correction capability 𝑡.
2) Decryption: calculate 𝜑−1(c) by the following steps:
∙ cP−1 = uSG+ eP−1, where 𝑤(eP−1) = 𝑤(e).
∙ Decode cP−1 applying decoding algorithm 𝜉 of
code 𝐶: 𝜉(cP−1) = uS. After this step we obtain
some linear combination of transmitted word u
∙ Calculate u = uSS−1.
In this case the open key in McEliece cryptosystem is
(G′, 𝑡) and a secret one is a factorization (S,G,P). Without
knowledge of secret key intruder has to solve complex task of
decoding an arbitrary code described by it’s generator matrix
G′. This task is known to have an exponential complexity.
III. INFORMATION SET DECODING
An attack based on Information Set Decoding (ISD) is
known as one of the best ones against McEliece cryptosystem.
This type of attack was already mentioned in the initial
security analysis of McEliece [5] and further explored by Lee
and Brickell [8]. There are a different modifications of this
decoding with the best known complexity of ?˜?(20.054𝑛) [16].
In this paper we describe the general concept of this decoding.
The task of ISD decoder is to recover information vector u
from c = uG + e, where G is a generator matrix of (𝑛, 𝑘)
code 𝐶 with minimal distance 𝑑 = 2𝑡+ 1 and 𝑤𝑡(e) ≤ 𝑡.
Let us denote by 𝒥 some subset of {1, 2, . . . , 𝑛} and by
G𝒥 the matrix which contains only columns at indexes from
𝒥 of G. At the same manner by e𝒥 we denote |𝒥 |-length
vector with elements of e that are placed in indexes from 𝒥 .
In this case to obtain u one applies the following algorithm:
1) Randomly choose 𝑘 indexes 𝒥 ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , 𝑛}.
2) If there are no errors in c𝒥 then the following relation-
ship holds: c𝒥 = u𝒥G𝒥 + e𝒥 .
3) If 𝑤𝑡
(︀
c+ c𝒥G−1𝒥 G
)︀
= 𝑡 then there is no error in c𝒥
and thus 𝑤𝑡(e𝒥 ) = 0. In this case u = c𝒥G−1𝒥 . Else
return to Step 1.
It is easy to notice that the probability 𝑃𝑠 of having no errors
in the chosen 𝑘 indexes is
𝑃𝑠 =
(︀
𝑛−𝑡
𝑘
)︀(︀
𝑛
𝑘
)︀ = (︀𝑛−𝑘𝑡 )︀(︀𝑛
𝑡
)︀ .
Thus the average number of decoding attempts 𝜏 before
finding free of errors information set is
𝜏 =
1
𝑃𝑠
=
(︀
𝑛
𝑡
)︀(︀
𝑛−𝑘
𝑡
)︀ .
This value 𝜏 can be considered as a complexity of ISD
decoding algorithm.
In the next section we will describe new cryptosystem and
show that attack based on ISD decoding can not be applied to
it. Thus in order to obtain the same security level, significantly
shorter codes can be used in new system.
IV. NEW CODE-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM
Let us first describe the main parts of suggested code-based
cryptosystem.
We consider some (𝑛, 𝑘) code 𝐶. We will denote a gener-
ating matrix of this code by G and any fixed information set
of this code by 𝒥 . Let us also consider 𝑛 × 𝑛 𝑞-ary matrix
G0 that consists of 𝑛 arbitrary codewords of 𝐶:
G0 =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
c1
c2
. . .
c𝑛
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ,
where c𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑖 = 1..𝑛.
Let us denote by M and T some arbitrary and non-singular
𝑛× 𝑛 matrices over F𝑞 . We also consider such 𝑛× 𝑛 matrix
Q that:
QT =
(︀
0𝒥 R[𝑛]∖𝒥
)︀
,
where 𝒥 is an informational set of code 𝐶, [𝑛] ∖ 𝒥 is the
complement of set 𝒥 , 0 is 𝑛×𝑘 zero matrix, R is 𝑛×(𝑛−𝑘)
full-rank matrix. It means that matrix QT has zero columns in
positions of information set 𝒥 of 𝐶 and other 𝑛− 𝑘 columns
are non-zero and forms full-rank matrix R.
The proposed cryptosystem is as follows:
∙ Open key: (G′,G′2) = (GM,Q(G0 +T)M)
∙ Private key: (G,M,T,Q,G0,𝒥 )
Encryption/decryption are as follows:
1) Encryption: Let us consider that we have some plaintext
u which is a 𝑞-ary vector of length 𝑘. The encrypted text
is: 𝜑(u) = c = uG′ + eG′2, where e is a 𝑞-ary random
vector of arbitrary weight.
2) Decryption: Calculate 𝜑−1(c) by the following steps:
∙ y = cM−1 = uG+eQ(G0+T) = uG+eQG0+
eQT.
∙ Notice that uG+ eQG0 ∈ 𝐶 and vector eQT has
non-zero positions only on [𝑛]∖𝒥 , i. e. information
set 𝒥 is free of errors. Thus:
y − y𝒥G−1𝒥 G = eQT
∙ Calculate eQTT−1 = eQ
∙ Calculate eQG0
∙ Find u from uG = y − eQG0 − eQT
Let us show how to construct matrices Q and T such that
QT has rank 𝑛− 𝑘 and has 𝑘 zero columns at positions 𝒥 .
Let T any non-singular matrix and T𝒥 is the matrix which
contains only columns at indexes from 𝒥 of T. If we consider
matrix T𝑇𝒥 as a generator matrix of some code, then there exist
a matrix X𝒥 of size (𝑛−𝑘)×𝑛 such that X𝒥T𝒥 = 0. Let us
construct matrix Q = LX𝒥 , where L is (𝑛− 𝑘)×𝑛 arbitrary
full-rank matrix. It is obvious that matrix QT = LX𝒥T has
zero columns at positions 𝒥 and other columns form full-rank
matrix.
V. ATTACKS AGAINST PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section we discuss some attacks on proposed cryp-
tosystem: direct attacks, syndrome-based attacks and decoding
attacks.
A. Direct Attack
A direct attack can be implemented either by finding vector
u or e for a given c = uG′ + eG′2, G
′ and G′2. It takes
at most 𝑞𝑘 rounds to recover u directly from c. Since rank
of G′2 is 𝑛 − 𝑘 then 𝑞𝑛−𝑘 rounds are required to recover e
from c even when weight of e is an arbitrary. To recover u
from e an attacker has to solve the equation c− eG′2 = uG′.
Let us show that this equation has unique solution e such that
c− eG′2 ∈ 𝐶. Let us assume that there are two error vectors
e1, e2 that corresponds to the same codeword. It means that{︃
c− e1G′2 = uG′
c− e2G′2 = uG′
or
(e1 − e2)Q(G0 +T) = 0,
since (e1 − e2)QG0 ∈ 𝐶, then the number of solutions of
(e1 − e2)Q(G0+T) = 0 equals to the number of codewords
of 𝐶 that can be represented as (e1 − e2)QT. Let us assume
that c′ ∈ 𝐶 and c′ = (e1 − e2)QT. Since QT𝒥 = 0, where
𝒥 is an information set of 𝐶, then c′𝒥 = 0 for any e1 and
e2. It means that c′ = 0 and thus (e1 − e2)Q(G0 +T) = 0
has unique solution and e1 = e2.
Moreover, using previous reasoning it can be proved that
the system {︃
c− e1G′2 = u1G′
c− e2G′2 = u2G′
can be fulfilled only when u1 = u2 and e1 = e2.
Summarizing all we can conclude that complexity of direct
attack is at most 𝑞min{𝑘,𝑛−𝑘}.
B. Direct Decoding Attack
The main idea of direct decoding attack is to find the un-
known error vector e from the known ciphertext c and known
G′ = GM. Since ciphertext has the form c = uG′ + eG′2,
then intruder has to decode in some coset eQT+ 𝐶 of code
𝐶 where the weight of error vector eQTM is up to 𝑛 − 𝑘.
But even if this error vector can be found, the obtained code
word will have the form uGM+eQG0M and it is difficult to
recover u without knowledge of M, G, G0, T and Q. Thus
any direct decoding methods including ISD decoding can not
been implemented to break the cryptosystem.
C. Syndrome-Based Decoding Attack
In this section we discuss sydrome-based attack. We are
going to show that syndrome-based attack is infeasible to the
proposed cryptosystem.
Let us remind how to implement syndrome-based attack. To
use it an attacker has to contruct parity-check matrix H′ for
known matrix G′ = GM. It is easy to check that
H′ = LH
(︀
M−1
)︀𝑇
,
where H is a parity-check matrix, corresponds to generating
matrix G and L is some non-singular (𝑛 − 𝑘) × (𝑛 − 𝑘)
matrix over F𝑞 . It is clear that matrix L does not affect code
properties. Thus we can assume that L = I. In this case the
syndrome S of ciphertext c is as follows:
S = cH′𝑇 = eQTH𝑇 = e
(︁
H (QT)
𝑇
)︁𝑇
.
The latest equation means that intruder has to solve syndrome
equation for parity-check matrix H (QT)𝑇 where matrix QT
is singular. In this case we can not state that the properties
of code 𝐶 ′ with this parity-check matrix are the same as for
code 𝐶 with parity-check matrix H. Moreover, next example
shows that transformation (QT)𝑇 usually results in random
code.
Example 1: Let us consider (63, 24) BCH code. This code
has minimum distance 15 and can correct up to 7 independent
errors. Any information set of this code consists of 𝑘 = 24
elements and thus for the case when given information set is
free of errors, then at most 𝑛 − 𝑘 = 29 errors placed out
of information set can be corrected. If we consider generating
matrix of this code in canonical form, then we can assume that
𝐽 = {1, 2, . . . , 24} is information set of the code. We randomly
constructed 100 different matrices QT of size 63 × 63 such
that (QT)𝐽 = 0 and other 29 columns forms 63 × 29 full
rank matrix. Fig. 1 represents weight spectrum of codes with
parity-check matrices in the form H (QT)𝑇 , where H is a
parity-check matrix of (63, 24) BCH code (blue curve).
Figure 1. Spectra of codes defined by different parity-check matrices
H (QT)𝑇 obtained from H of (63, 24) BCH code
From Fig. 1 it can be noticed that singular transformation
(QT)
𝑇 does not hold code properties: even when code rate
does not change, new code looks like random one with normal
weight distribution (red curve). But there are some cases
when linear transformation (QT)𝑇 leads to zero rows in
H (QT)
𝑇 : purple and green curves. Purple curve corresponds
to one zero row in H (QT)𝑇 and thus corresponding code has
parameters (63, 25) and green curve corresponds to two zero
rows in H (QT)𝑇 and the corresponding code has parameters
(63, 26). Both (63, 25) and (63, 26) codes have normal weight
distributions and thus can be considered as random ones.
Table 2 represents minimal distance properties of obtained
codes.
As it can be noticed transformation (QT)𝑇 usually results
in one zero row in matrix H (QT)𝑇 - the number of (63, 25)
codes is 60 and thus the probability to obtain code with this
parameters from (63, 24) BCH code is approximately 0.6.
Moreover, the variance of minimal distance in all cases is
rather small and equals to ≈ 0, 56. In the last column of
Table I
MINIMAL DISTANCE PROPERTIES OF 100 CODES OBTAINED FROM (63, 24)
BCH CODE
Code # minimal distance
min max average variance VG bound
(63,24) 29 10 13 11,28 0,56 9,66
(63,25) 60 8 12 10,67 0,56 9,26
(63,26) 11 9 11 10,18 0,56 8,87
the table the minimal distances of (63, 24), (63, 25), (63, 26)
codes on Varshamov-Gilbert (VG) bound are represented. As
it can be noticed, the obtained average values of minimal
distances are rather close to the ones on VG bound. Thus
the transformation (QT)𝑇 usually results in random code.
The previous example and reasoning shows that sydrome-
based attack is infeasible for the proposed cryptosystem. There
are at least two reasons: parity-check matrix H (QT)𝑇 is
random, thus we can always choose matrix H that allows
to correct significantly more errors than random code. The
second reason is that the weight of e is arbitrary and thus
it is not a coset leader. It means that applying any decoding
algorithm an intruder usually find such e′: 𝑑(c−e′G′2,uG′) <
𝑑(c− eG′2,uG′), where e is valid error vector.
VI. OPEN KEY SIZE
In the first point of view the modification of McEliece cryp-
tosystem can only increase an open key size since in this case
length of the key is 𝑛2+𝑘(𝑛−𝑘) while the open key original
McEliece cryptosystem has length 𝑘(𝑛−𝑘). But it was shown
that the best-known attack based on Information Set Decoding
(ISD) can not be applied for this modification and thus this
cryptosystem can be based on codes with significantly smaller
lengths than of ones for ordinary McEliece cryptosystem.
Let us consider the following examples:
Example 2: The initial parameters of McEliece cryptosystem
are as follows: 𝑛 = 1024, 𝑘 = 524, 𝑡 = 50, thus log2 𝜏 ≈
53. In order to obtain the same workfactor as for original
McEliece cryptosystem in modified cryptosystem we need to
find such code 𝐶 ′ with length 𝑛′ and correcting performance
𝑘′ that min{𝑘′, 𝑛′ − 𝑘′} ≈ 53.
BCH Code with parameters (𝑛′, 𝑘′, 𝑡′) = (127, 71, 9) has
workfactor log2 𝜏
′ ≈ 56. In the case of (1024, 524, 50) size
of the open key is 𝑘(𝑛 − 𝑘) = 262000 bits and in proposed
cryptosystem nearly the same workfactor can be obtained for
open key size 𝑛′2 + 𝑘′(𝑛′ − 𝑘′) = 20105 bits which is more
than 13 times smaller.
Example 3: To obtain workfactor 80 the following pa-
rameters of original McEliece cryprosystem are used: 𝑛 =
2048, 𝑘 = 1751, 𝑡 = 27. This results in key size of approxi-
mately 520000 bits.
At the same time in modified cryptosystem the based on
BCH code with parameters 𝑛′ = 255, 𝑘′ = 79, 𝑡′ = 27
has workfactor 79 and open key size 78929 bits which is
approximately 6.6 times smaller.
Example 4: For stability against a quantum computer, the
parameters should be increased to 𝑛 = 6960, 𝑘 = 5413, 𝑡 =
119, and the size of the public key grows is up to 8373911 bits.
The workfactor of such cryptosystem will be approximately
263.
At the same time in modified cryptosystem the based on
BCH code with parameters 𝑛′ = 1023, 𝑘′ = 268, 𝑡′ = 103
has workfactor 268 and open key size 1818894 bits which is
approximately 4.6 times smaller.
All these examples show that proposed cryptosystem allows
to significantly reduce open key size. Moreover, it does not de-
pend on code which underlines McEliece cryptosystem. Thus
this modification can be used jointly with code substitution,
providing further reduction in public key size.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered a new construction of well-
known McEliece cryptosystem that allows to reduce the public
key size and can be implemented for an arbitrary class of
codes, i. e. it is code-independent. We considered some signifi-
cant limitations on the parts of this cryptosystem and explained
why best-known attacks against McElice cryptosystem based
on information set decoding can not be implemented for the
proposed modification. We also suggested some examples
which demonstrated that open key size can be reduced in
several times.
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